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Profitable failure:
antidepressant drugs and the
triumph of flawed experiments
LINSEY MCGOEY
ABSTRACT
Drawing on an analysis of Irving Kirsch and colleagues’ controversial
2008 article in PLoS [Public Library of Science] Medicine on the efficacy
of SSRI antidepressant drugs such as Prozac, I examine flaws within
the methodologies of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) that have
made it difficult for regulators, clinicians and patients to determine the
therapeutic value of this class of drug. I then argue, drawing analogies
to work by Pierre Bourdieu and Michael Power, that it is the very limi-
tations of RCTs – their inadequacies in producing reliable evidence of
clinical effects – that help to strengthen assumptions of their superior-
ity as methodological tools. Finally, I suggest that the case of RCTs
helps to explore the question of why failure is often useful in consoli-
dating the authority of those who have presided over that failure, and
why systems widely recognized to be ineffective tend to assume greater
authority at the very moment when people speak of their malfunction.
Key words ambiguity, antidepressants, clinical trials, strategic
ignorance, valuable failure
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INTRODUCTION
Before a packed lecture hall at the Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College,
London, four men and one woman sat on a podium, watching the crowd
with uneasy smiles. The speakers were gathered for the 36th Maudsley debate,
which took place on 4 June 2008. Named for Henry Maudsley, a pioneering
British psychiatrist and founder of the hospital in South London that bears
his name, Maudsley debates are a chance for practising clinicians, medical
students and patients to listen to world-renowned experts discuss some of
the most controversial issues in psychiatry today.
On 4 June the audience was gathered to hear two eminent British scientists,
Lewis Wolpert and Guy Goodwin, address claims by an equally eminent
American psychologist named Irving Kirsch about the usefulness of anti-
depressant drugs. ‘The Drugs Don’t Work’ was the title of the debate. The
motion was: ‘The house believes that antidepressants are no better than
placebo’. Arguing in favour was Kirsch, who had published a study in PLoS
[Public Library of Science] Medicine four months before which suggested
antidepressants such as Prozac are no more clinically efficacious than placebo
in treating all but the most severe forms of depression. He was joined by
Joanna Moncrieff, a clinical psychiatrist, senior lecturer at University College
London (UCL), and recent author of The Myth of the Chemical Cure, a book
that contests dominant perceptions of the mechanistic action of antidepres-
sant drugs.
Arguing against the motion was Guy Goodwin, head of the Department
of Psychiatry at Oxford University and former president of the British
Association for Psychopharmacology, and Lewis Wolpert, emeritus professor
of biology at UCL. Wolpert is a public figure in the UK, known for pub-
lishing his own experiences of depression in the book Malignant Sadness: The
Anatomy of Depression.
The stakes of the Maudsley debate were high. Drugs such as Prozac have
been developed, licensed and prescribed on the basis of the same methodo-
logical tools used to measure the safety and efficacy of all psychotropic drugs.
If, as Kirsch suggested, psychiatrists had somehow overestimated the use-
fulness of Prozac, then they may have misperceived the usefulness of any
number of routinely prescribed treatments.
Using the debate as a window into a disciplinary battle often reserved to
sparring factions within psychiatric departments, this article explores the
ramifications of recent debates over the efficacy of antidepressants. I suggest
that, for those who insist on the usefulness of antidepressants and those who
doubt it, each group is aware of methodological limitations that have made
it difficult to determine the value of the drugs. This shared awareness of their
own methodological limitations – their knowledge of their own ignorance
– leads to conflict over how to address methodological shortcomings, and
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ultimately to the perpetuation of the very limitations that have led to con-
flicting views on the drugs in the first place.
The structure of the article is as follows. First, I provide a summary of the
Maudsley debate. Second, drawing on Kirsch’s recent article on the efficacy
of antidepressants, as well as work by Andrew Lakoff, David Healy and Ted
Kaptchuk on the construction of clinical trials, I explore problems with the
use of rating scales in trials for psychotropic drugs, as well as problems
surrounding the recruitment of patients into antidepressant trials. Third, I
explore how researchers and clinical triallists who are aware of the limits of
RCTs must collaborate in ignoring or obfuscating those limitations in order
to meet regulatory demands for scientific precision and specificity. Finally,
drawing analogies to work by Michael Power, I suggest it is the very
deficiencies of RCTs – their inadequacies in producing reliable evidence of
clinical effects – that help to strengthen popular and scientific assumptions
of their superiority as methodological tools.
Methodologically, the article draws on participant observation at numerous
psychiatric meetings and conferences such as the Maudsley debate; textual
analysis of the records of UK and US regulatory inquiries into the safety of
antidepressant drugs; and over 20 in-depth interviews with psychiatrists,
psychopharmacologists and regulators involved with efforts to determine the
safety of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), from experts such
as Kent Woods, CEO of the UK’s Medicines and Healthcare Products Regu-
latory Agency (MHRA), to Tim Kendall, co-director of the UK’s National
Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, to Michael Shooter, former presi-
dent of the UK’s Royal College of Psychiatrists.
‘I ’D LIKE TO PUT MY TONGUE OUT TO ALL OF
YOU’:  PASSIONATE SCIENCE AT THE MAUDSLEY
The Maudsley debate on 4 June lasted for just over an hour and half. The
speakers were each granted 10 minutes to make their case, followed by ques-
tions from the audience. Below, I offer a summary of each presentation. Later
on, I expand on some of the common points that emerged, such as questions
over the usefulness of psychiatric rating scales, recruitment pressures, and
problems surrounding the placebo effect in antidepressant trials.
The 4 June debate was chaired by Tom Fahy, a professor of forensic mental
health at the Institute of Psychiatry. Introducing the speakers, Fahy stressed
that, particularly as the NHS (the UK’s National Health Service) ‘spends
£381 million a year on antidepressants’, the motion was an important one.
He then invited Kirsch, the first speaker, to the podium.1 Kirsch said that he
was uncomfortable speaking for the motion as it stood, because, as he has
indicated in his article in PloS Medicine, antidepressants are statistically
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superior to placebo – the question is whether this significance is of any use
clinically. Tests of statistical significance indicate whether a result can be
attributed to the inherent properties of the phenomena being studied, or
whether a result stems from chance. Tests of clinical effectiveness, on the
other hand, have to do with the size of that effect: they address the question
of, as Kirsch said, ‘How much difference would it make in anybody’s life?’
Kirsch began by describing the details of the PLoS article that sparked the
controversy. He explained that his study, undertaken with colleagues in the
USA and Canada and published in PLoS Medicine, was a meta-analysis (a
statistical compilation of individual RCTs) of all the clinical trial data sub-
mitted to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the licensing of
four commonly prescribed antidepressants. Kirsch said the results demon-
strated that the antidepressants had statistically significant benefits over
placebo, but that those results were of little clinical significance. Drawing on
the stipulation of the UK’s National Institute for Health and Clinical Excel-
lence (NICE) for a 3-point improvement in score on the Hamilton Rating
Scale for Depression – a 51-point checklist used to determine the severity of
a patient’s depression – as the threshold for clinical significance, Kirsch
argued that an improvement in 1.8 points is not great enough to consider
antidepressants more clinically effective than placebo.
Kirsch then flagged an objection to his own argument: the fact that NICE’s
calculation of clinical significance for antidepressant trials is an arbitrary
threshold point. There is no scientific reason to believe that a 3-point improve-
ment in Hamilton scores is any more useful than an improvement of 10-
point. Despite the arbitrary character of all tests of clinical significance, Kirsch
stressed that they are necessary, because ‘you can’t make a decision without
them’.
Kirsch turned to a second objection to his study: the suggestion that the
individual clinical trials he examines in his meta-analysis are flawed, under-
mining its value. Kirsch said he agreed with that objection: the individual
trials are flawed, with a major problem being that subjects recruited into the
trials ‘are just not depressed enough’ – for ethical reasons that I describe later
on. This argument, Kirsch suggested, simply proves his point. If the patient
population recruited into RCT trials is not representative of the vast majority
who will take them, then ‘clinically significant differences between anti-
depressants and placebo have not been established’, because the RCTs used
to license the four antidepressants are not reliable indicators of the drugs’
clinical usefulness. On the other hand, if the trial subjects are representative,
then, given the findings of his recent meta-analysis, his conclusion remains the
same: ‘clinically significant differences between antidepressants and placebo
have not been established’.
Guy Goodwin was the next speaker. He started by noting that he agreed
with Kirsch: clinical trials are often not representative of clinical practice, and
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there are now ‘efforts to improve clinical trial methodologies stimulated by
criticisms’ from individuals such as Kirsch. Goodwin went on to detail some
of the flaws within clinical trial methodologies that make it hard to interpret
the results of RCT trials. He focused in particular on the problem of the
placebo effect. In antidepressants’ trials that have been carried out, a puzzling
phenomenon has occurred: the number of patients who have responded well
to the placebo arm of trials has often been almost as high as those who have
responded well to antidepressants, leading some to suggest that a placebo
effect – stemming from, for example, the cathartic value of sheer partici-
pation in a trial – is responsible for much of the therapeutic efficacy typically
attributed to antidepressants.
Goodwin contested this, suggesting that there are a number of reasons why
participants on the placebo arms of trials might appear to respond equally
well to placebo, such as the problem of baseline rating inflation, where a
patient with mild depression or even non-existent depression might be
enrolled in a trial by overly enthusiastic trial investigators, who, for financial
reasons, ‘are motivated to enter lots of patients into trials’. Often, such
participants might appear to become more agitated and less depressed as the
trial goes on, something that, in Goodwin’s view, stems less from the effect
of placebo than from the fact that their initial ‘baseline’ level of depression
might not have been as high as recruiters initially purported in order to enrol
subjects in the first place.
Joanna Moncrieff took the podium next. She focused on problems with
rating scales such as the Hamilton and their use in RCTs that make it difficult
to determine the mechanistic action of antidepressants, as well as their thera-
peutic value. She stressed that as most antidepressants have sedative effects,
and therefore can produce less agitation and less wakefulness, they might
appear, on a clinical trial, to be alleviating depression, while in reality they
may simply be increasing a subject’s level of sedation: ‘anything with sedative
effects is likely to look good in a trial that uses a depression rating scale’.
As Moncrieff returned to her seat, Lewis Wolpert made his way to the
microphone. ‘Listening to the last speaker’, he said, leaning over and height-
ening the microphone, ‘clearly, she has never been depressed. In fact, I say to
psychiatrists: many of you who treat depressives, but have not been depressed,
haven’t a clue what it’s about.
‘I suffer from depression, and the idea that I take my antidepressant every
morning – mine is Effexor, I take a low dose – the idea that I’m doing this as
a placebo, well, I’d like to put my tongue out to all of you. Now, I know it’s
not scientific if I say that I know this antidepressant is working. But I do
know that over the last 13 years I’ve taken different antidepressants, and when
one doesn’t work, I’ve changed to another.
‘I was suicidal’, he continued. ‘Why did I stop being suicidal? I think it was
the antidepressants in the first place, and then later on, cognitive behavioural
HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 23(1)62
 at UNIV OF ESSEX on July 18, 2014hhs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
therapy.’ Wolpert shifted slightly and addressed Kirsch directly. ‘I think this
particular article of yours has done enormous damage to people with depres-
sion.’ He turned back to the audience. ‘Please vote against this absurd motion.’
Later on, I will return briefly to the Maudsley debate in order to analyse
the implications of these comments. First, I turn to an elaboration of the
problems with RCT methodologies pointed out by the speakers.
ANTIDEPRESSANT EFFICACY AND THE
METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS OF RCTS
Kirsch and his colleagues’ study, ‘Initial Severity and Antidepressant Benefits:
a Meta-Analysis of Data submitted to the Food and Drug Administration’,
examined the clinical trial data submitted to the FDA for the licensing of four
SSRI and SNRI antidepressants: fluoxetine (Prozac); venlafaxine (Effexor);
nefazodone (serzone) and paroxetine (Paxil/Seroxat). They suggested in exam-
ining these trials, as Kirsch notes at the debate, that antidepressants are no
more clinically effective than placebo except in treating severe depression.2
In the following section, I focus on three things that complicate Kirsch’s
findings: the usefulness of rating scales in psychiatric trials; problems sur-
rounding how to determine clinical significance; and recruitment bias.
Since the 1960s, US and UK regulators have stipulated that all new medi-
cines must be tested for efficacy and safety through RCTs in order to earn
licences, a phenomenon attracting increasing attention from social scientists
interested in the rise of standardized testing and its influence on drug regu-
lation and delivery (see, for example, Abraham, 2007; Abraham and Sheppard,
1999; Corrigan, 2002; Dehue, 2002; Lakoff, 2005, 2007; Marks, 1997; Sunder
Rajan, 2007; Timmermans, 2005; Timmermans and Berg, 2003; Vrecko, 2008;
Wahlberg and McGoey, 2007; Will, 2007). The double-blind RCT, where
neither the trial administrators nor trial participants know who is receiving
the active treatment or who the control, has long been hailed as the gold
standard for determining a new treatment’s worth, because the use of blinding,
random allocation and control groups helps to determine whether the treat-
ment itself or an outside variable – such as the individual’s physiology or an
environmental factor – produces the treatment’s effects.
RCTs emerged as a way for regulators to evaluate the safety of treatments,
as well as a way to ensure human experimentation takes place in controlled,
institutional settings that are themselves subject to regulatory oversight. The
need for drug manufacturers to obtain evidence of the safety of new drugs
through undertaking ‘adequate and well-controlled trials’ which are large
enough to permit quantitative evaluation of treatment effects using ‘appro-
priate statistical methods’ soon became an obligatory passage point for the
evaluation and licensing of new therapies (Marks, 1997: 130).
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An impetus leading medical researchers in the mid-20th century to carry
out clinical trials was their role in producing demonstrable results which
could be shown to governmental authorities in order to procure more
research funds. Austin Bradford Hill, for example, who directed the UK
Medical Research Council’s celebrated 1948 trial of streptomycin in pul-
monary tuberculosis, viewed the trial as a way to ‘speedily and effectively
reveal the value of the treatment’ in order to secure funds for its more
universal provision (Doll, 2003: 930). RCTs serve as technologies of trust, to
use Theodore Porter’s term: a means to promote confidence in the outcomes
of experiments within ‘weak communities’ where personal ties between
regulators, researchers and clinicians are limited due to distance and the size
of research communities (Porter, 1995: 225). They can also be considered
inscriptions in Latour’s sense: devices combinable with other inscriptions
in a way that augments the power of the numbers or concepts behind the
inscriptions, while simultaneously simplifying their visual representation (cf.
Latour, 1986).
On the heels of Hill’s successful trial demonstrating the usefulness of strep-
tomycin in TB patients, the value of RCTs eventually came to be accepted by
clinicians in the UK and USA, in part as a way to counter advertorial claims
of therapeutic efficacy advanced by the pharmaceutical industry (Marks, 1997:
157).3 By helping to generate visible evidence – accessible to both clinician
and patient – RCTs were seen as providing a defence against arbitrary claims
of a treatment’s worth. A physician who refused to implement the evidence
from a controlled trial was not simply acting parochially or archaically: she
was acting immorally – unduly exposing patients to the unsubstantiated claims
of industry, or worse, to the vagaries of her own personal whims. In recent
years, despite the fact that the majority of RCTs are either conducted or
funded by the pharmaceutical industry, the methodology itself has retained
its early status as a defence against industry bias.
As I explore below, a conundrum has emerged alongside the justifiable
faith in RCTs as a way to determine and demonstrate a treatment’s worth.
Partly because of the regulatory and clinical dependence on RCTs, problems
within individual RCTs are rarely seen as indictments of the methodology as
a whole: instead, they are used as evidence of the need to refine and perfect
the methodology further. Secondly, when a treatment’s effects are difficult to
measure quantitatively, such as with psychotropic drugs, measures must be
introduced in order to demonstrate commensurability among trial partici-
pants and to evaluate drug response, something that makes it difficult to know
whether the effects of a drug are due to its efficacy, or are simply a construct
of the measures adopted to demonstrate its worth. Third, what can be easily
demonstrated through RCTs assumes disproportionate importance, some-
thing illuminated by the tendency of regulators and clinicians to equate
statistical significance with clinical usefulness.
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The limitations of RCTs are especially visible with psychiatric drugs, where
effects are harder to measure than, say, a cancer therapy, where a blood test
can reveal a treatment’s value. Although the problem is particularly evident
with psychiatric drugs, many of the problems I discuss below are relevant to
all classes of drug, where a disproportionate privileging of statistical signi-
ficance had led to the licensing of numerous drugs with adverse effects that
were either innocently undetected or deliberately ignored because they could
not be easily measured.4
The difficulty in measuring the effect of an antidepressant drug can be seen
at every stage of its production and testing. In order to determine, for example,
whether a participant is eligible for enrolment in an antidepressant trial, one
first has to determine whether the patient has a psychiatric disorder, and its
level of severity. This is a challenge for psychiatry, where the process of diag-
nosing patients is one that can vary widely among different clinical settings. In
response to this problem, psychiatrists developed scales, such as the Hamilton
rating scale, where behaviour and mood are codified and categorized accord-
ing to standardized checklists. Patients receive a score for responses to ques-
tions about mood, insomnia, sexual function and so on – and the final score
is used to help determine the severity of a patient’s illness. As Andrew Lakoff
notes, by translating ‘subjective experience into quantitative cut-off points and
outcome measures, [rating scales] make it possible to assemble and compare
groups of patients across sites and between evaluators’ (2007: 58). In psy-
chiatry, there are a number of general domains of measurement: disease-
specific rating scales, such as the Hamilton; patient-based disease-specific
scales, such as the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI); and patient-based non-
disease-specific scales of global functioning, such as the Quality of Life scale
(Healy, 2001: 323).
One of the problems with rating scales is that, as Moncrieff reiterated on
4 June, they have numerous questions related to sleep and anxiety, items likely
to show effective change with any drugs with sedative properties (Moncrieff,
2002). A second problem, as David Healy points out, is that changes in rating
scale scores are sometimes presented as evidence of a treatment’s efficacy,
when, in reality, a drop in a Hamilton score from 38 to 19 points does not
necessarily say anything about a treatment’s clinical value (Healy, 2001: 323).
Healy’s point refers to a question that has received a problematic dearth of
attention in medicine, in drug regulation, and in the social sciences in general:
the conflation of statistical significance with effectiveness in practice, and the
tendency of regulators to view statistical significance as proof that a drug
or treatment will be useful clinically. As Tim Kendall, joint director of the
UK’s National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, notes in a recent
interview, and as Kirsch pointed out on 4 June, too often with drug trials,
regulators, clinicians and manufacturers equate statistical significance with
clinical significance, when, in reality, a drug that is shown to be statistically
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better than placebo or a comparator is not necessarily any better in a clinical
setting (Graham, 2008; Kendall and McGoey, 2007). Misinterpretation of the
real-world value of an effect shown to be statistically significant is not a
problem limited to medicine. As Deirdre McCloskey and Stephen Ziliak
argue, researchers in economics, psychology, pharmacology and education,
among others, have overwhelmingly privileged the question of whether an
effect is due to chance or inherent value, i.e. whether it is statistically signifi-
cant, over questions of how large is the effect in practice, or what difference
will it make if implemented (Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008).
Within medicine, tests of statistical significance give a yes or no answer to
the question of whether a drug’s effect is due to chance, but say nothing about
the size of that effect (cf. Healy, 2006; Healy, 2009; Turner and Rosenthal,
2008). In contrast, effect sizes – or the measure of the strength of the relation-
ship between two variables – do allow, in principle, the ability to determine
clinical significance, and some researchers and policy-makers are beginning,
only now, to grasp the importance of evaluating clinical usefulness.
There are numerous different ways to calculate effect sizes. In comparing
two groups, such as placebo response and antidepressant response, a typical
effect size index is a standardized mean difference, where the mean response
on the placebo arm would be subtracted from the mean response on the active
arm, and then divided by the standard deviation of either group. Standard-
ized mean difference as an effect size measure was suggested in the 1960s by
Jacob Cohen, who proposed values of 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 to represent small,
medium and large effects respectively (Huberty, 2002; Turner and Rosenthal,
2008). Drawing on Cohen’s work, the UK’s National Institute for Clinical
Excellence (NICE), a body that formulates treatment guidelines for the UK’s
National Health Service, suggested that in antidepressant trials, effect sizes
of 0.5 or greater should be considered clinically significant. In trials that
employed the Hamilton scale, a 3-point difference or more in Hamilton
change scores was viewed as the threshold for clinical efficacy (NICE, 2004).
In their recent analysis of antidepressant trials, Kirsch and colleagues (2008)
found that the four antidepressants had a mean improvement of 9.60 points
on the Hamilton scale. Scores on the placebo arms improved by 7.80 points.
The mean drug–placebo difference was therefore 1.80 in Hamilton improve-
ment scores, an effect size difference that Kirsch calculates as 0.32. Drawing
on NICE’s stipulation of 0.5 as the cut-off for clinical significance, Kirsch
argues that a difference of 0.32 is not great enough to consider antidepres-
sants more clinically effective than placebo.
Although the finding is logical when seen through the lens of NICE’s
recommendations for clinical significance, it also calls into question, as Turner
and Rosenthal (2008) note, the usefulness, and universal applicability, of
NICE’s cut-off point of 0.5. Writing in the British Medical Journal in the
aftermath of Kirsch’s study, Turner and Rosenthal note that Kirsch’s findings
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were remarkably similar to their own study of the selective publication of
antidepressant trials, published in the New England Journal of Medicine in
January 2008. The main finding of both studies was that antidepressant drugs
are far less effective than is apparent from the published clinical trial data that
have appeared in medical journals. Turner and Rosenthal derived an overall
effect size of 0.31 as a measure of the efficacy of antidepressants, a size similar
to Kirsch’s value of 0.32.
‘Although these two sets of results were in excellent agreement’, noted
Turner and Rosenthal in the British Medical Journal (BMJ), ‘our interpreta-
tions of them were quite different.’ They concluded that antidepressants are
clinically superior to placebo, while Kirsch concluded antidepressants are
ineffective. The difference stems from Kirsch’s reliance on NICE’s stipula-
tion of a 3-point difference in Hamilton scores as a determination of clinical
significance, something Turner and Rosenthal view as questionable:
On what basis did NICE adopt the 0.5 value as a cut-off? When Cohen
first proposed these landmark effect sizes, he wrote, ‘The terms “small”,
“medium”, and “large” are relative . . . the definitions are arbitrary . . .
these proposed conventions were set forth with much diffidence, qual-
ifications, and invitations not to employ them if possible’. He also said,
‘The values chosen had no more reliable a basis than my own intu-
ition’. Thus, it seems doubtful that he would have endorsed NICE’s
use of an effect size of 0.5 as a litmus test for drug efficacy. (Turner and
Rosenthal, 2008: 516)
Turner and Rosenthal go on to illustrate their point with an analogy.
Imagine, they suggest, antidepressant efficacy in terms of litres of a fluid
called ‘d-juice’. In their study, they found 0.41 litres of d-juice in the ‘glass’
representing published clinical trials, and 0.31 litres of d-juice in the studies
– both unpublished and published – held by the FDA. Although 0.31 litres
of juice is less than the 0.41 litres suggested by the pharmaceutical industry
in published data, it is still enough to suggest that antidepressants have some
clinical usefulness. Kirsch and colleagues found 0.32 litres of d-juice, but
unlike Turner and Rosenthal, they concluded, on the basis of NICE recom-
mendations, that the ‘glass’ of antidepressant efficacy was entirely empty
(Turner and Rosenthal, 2008).
Although Kirsch himself, speaking at the Maudsley debate, alluded to the
arbitrariness of NICE’s calculation of clinical significance, what he did not
mention is that he had earlier published work challenging NICE’s measure-
ment – the same measurement that forms the basis of his argument in the
recent study in PLoS Medicine. In an article contesting NICE’s 2004 guide-
lines for the use of antidepressants in adults, Kirsch and Moncrieff note that
‘no research evidence or consensus is available about what constitutes a clini-
cally meaningful difference in Hamilton scores . . . NICE required a difference
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of at least 3-points as the criterion for clinical importance but gave no justifi-
cation for this figure’ (Moncrieff and Kirsch, 2005: 155).
In the carrying-out of antidepressant trials and the interpreting of their
results, uncertainty surrounding how well statistical significance translates
into clinical usefulness, uncertainty surrounding patient response, and un-
certainty surrounding how well rating scales can capture the nature of psy-
chiatric drug response, are something well known to clinical triallists and to
researchers such as Kirsch and Goodwin, both of whom pointed out on 4
June how useless, rather than useful, RCTs often are in revealing a drug’s
therapeutic value. Researchers are aware of the magnitude of what remains
impossible to know and to demonstrate through RCTs. In presenting the
results of trials to regulators or to journal editors, however, researchers must
obscure their own recognition of the uncertainty surrounding their methodo-
logical tools.
Whether one is convinced of the efficacy of antidepressants, or one doubts
it, the challenge is the same: to convince others of one’s findings and argu-
ments while fostering a lack of awareness of the many methodological weak-
nesses that have rendered one’s conclusions questionable. This challenge is
complicated by the fact that all are aware of the methodological limitations
in the studies of those with competing points of view. But to admit knowl-
edge of these limitations risks exposing the contingent nature of one’s own
results. Seen in this light, it is ignorance itself that is harnessed as a resource
in strategizing how to make the most of one’s knowledge.
The anthropologist Michael Taussig (1999) has written about the value of
non-knowledge, and how ‘knowing what not to know’ is a key social and
political tool of negotiation for both those in authority and those subject to
it. Secrecy and non-knowledge are indispensable to the operation of power,
‘Not only because power imposes secrecy on those whom it dominates, but
because it is perhaps just as indispensable to the latter’ (Taussig, 1999: 57).
In debates over the efficacy of antidepressants, strategic ignorance has been
useful to a range of parties, from researchers to manufacturers, and, thinking
back to Lewis Wolpert’s certainty of what a study such as Kirsch’s could not
know: his own personal reaction to antidepressants, to patients alike (for
further discussions of the political uses of ignorance and secrecy, see Barry,
2006; Lamble, 2009; McGoey, 2007; Proctor, 1995).
In the essay ‘Intentional Ignorance: a History of Blind Assessment and
Placebo Controls in Medicine’, Ted Kaptchuk (1998) notes that the spectre
of purposeful non-knowledge has been integral to the evidence produced by
clinical trials. The emphasis, for example, on blinding – where neither a trial
administrator nor a trial participant knows who has received the placebo or
who has received an active substance – emerged from the belief that even the
most respected biomedical researchers were capable of distorting trial out-
comes if their personal biases were left unrestrained:
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Previously, the taint and accusations of bias, prejudice, overenthusiasm,
credulity, and delusion were reserved for deviant healers; now, what
was once a fringe threat was internalized. Even the judgements of the
most senior clinicians concerning the efficacy of new therapeutics were
suspect. ‘Bias’ now haunted medicine. (1998: 430)
Because of its seeming rigour in controlling the personal influences both
of researcher and patients on trial outcomes, the double-blind RCT soon
became the epitome of morally incontestable experimentation: ‘the adoption
of blind assessment in medicine has had as much to do with shifting politi-
cal, moral and rhetorical agendas and technical research design issues as with
scientific standards of evidence. [Blinding] has been a vehicle to confer social
authority and moral legitimacy’ (Kaptchuk, 1998: 432).
Blinding was introduced to trials to help temper bias, to help free clinical
trials from political or personal influence. But, as the Maudsley debate illus-
trates, commercially and ethically motivated decisions about which patients
to include in trials and which standards of clinical efficacy to adopt remain
integral to the construction and implementation of clinical trials. Bias has
persisted, and taken on new forms, despite efforts to eradicate it through
blinding mechanisms – or perhaps because of need for creative means to
evade such mechanisms.5
In the next section, I turn to a separate problem highlighted in the debate
on 4 June – the fact that often subjects enrolled in an antidepressant trial are
not representative of the patients who will take the drug, something that
again calls into question the value of clinical trials as tools for determining
therapeutic usefulness. I then examine the paradox raised in the introduction:
why is it that RCTs command greater regulatory and rhetorical value the
more individuals point out the limitations of individual studies?
RECRUITMENT DEMANDS: SELECTING OUT
SEVERELY DEPRESSED PATIENTS
When designing an RCT to test a new antidepressant, the demands of select-
ing a group of standardized subjects eligible for enrolment in a trial are
complicated by the requirements of ethical review boards in North America
and Europe, which often stipulate that the more severe a person’s disorder,
the greater the ethical duty to avoid placing such a patient in a randomized
trial (Miller and Brody, 2002; Miller and Silverman, 2004). This is because
if they are randomized to the experimental treatment, they are potentially
denied access to the best, proven therapy, something that contravenes inter-
national statutes such as the Declaration of Helsinki that seek to protect the
human subjects of medical experimentation from harm or exploitation. In
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recent years, ethical review boards in the USA and the UK have sought to
adhere to international statutes such as Helsinki through demanding that
researchers curtail the use of placebo in clinical trials, as well as avoid recruit-
ing subjects at the severe end of a disorder, as those patients are more suscep-
tible to suffering adverse reactions (see Petryna, 2007).
A result of the stipulation against placebo use, as a UK psychiatrist based
at Oxford University described to me in an interview in February 2005, is
that much of the available RCT data for SSRI antidepressants such as Prozac
is ‘necessarily skewed towards the relatively mild, trouble-free end. Because
they’re the only people that it’s actually ethical to put in.’ This informant’s
point was returned to a number of times by psychiatrists and epidemiologists
I have spoken with. A former chair of the UK Royal College of Psychiatrists’
Faculty of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry noted, for example, that ‘you
almost have to be well in the States to get on a trial. Because if you’ve got
anything wrong with you, you get excluded.’ An epidemiologist with whom
I spoke in March 2005 noted that he found it unsurprising that early anti-
depressant trials had not shown the suicidal risk later detected by practising
clinicians because ‘they select out all the suicidal people. That’s what you do
in clinical trials. There’s nothing underhand about that.’
There may be nothing underhand about this tendency, but it does raise
the question of the usefulness of RCTs in determining clinical effects among
patients routinely excluded from trials for ethical reasons. One of the diffi-
culties raised by the systematic selection of individuals at the less severe end
of a disorder or a disease for participation in clinical trials is, as Healy has
stressed, the likelihood of a disconnect between a treatment’s performance
during a trial, and its performance when distributed clinically (Healy, 2001).
Complicating things further is the fact that, in the placebo-controlled trials
that have taken place despite increasingly strict ethical constraints, placebo
response has been, as both Goodwin and Kirsch noted at the Maudsley
debate, surprisingly high (see Wahlberg, 2008; Wilson, 2008).
Given this, a challenge for antidepressants’ manufacturers is proving to
national regulators that an antidepressant’s benefits are statistically significant
in comparison to placebo (Lakoff, 2007). To overcome this problem, manu-
facturers have adopted a number of practices geared at eliminating research
subjects who are likely to respond to placebo from the trial. As Lakoff was
told by a biostatistician, ‘The biggest problem is getting the right patients’,
through looking at clues that might indicate one’s susceptibility to respond-
ing to placebos – age of onset of depression, family history and so on – and
labelling those patients as ineligible for a trial. A second strategy has been the
adoption of the ‘mousetrap technique’, the name for a single-blind placebo
run-in period where doctors are aware of which patients are receiving a
placebo, while patients are unaware that the trial has not yet begun. With this
technique, experimenters stage a mini-trial, giving all patients a placebo for
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a week, and then eliminate those who have responded to the placebo (Lakoff,
2007: 67).
The development of tailored run-in periods is just one of the many tactics
adopted by manufacturers who struggle to meet regulatory requirements that
demand statistical evidence of efficacy through quantifiable measures such
as ratings scales. Even though manufacturers ‘are quite sceptical about the
capacity of the standard rating scales to produce a consistent patient popu-
lation for testing . . . and also that the scales are applied inconsistently by
raters’, they must collude with regulatory demands to demonstrate a con-
sistent drug response (Lakoff, 2007: 65). To researchers and clinicians, these
points are not surprising. If anything, the opposite is true: what is surprising
is how mundane such methodological obstacles appear to those conducting
and implementing RCTs. The question, though, is why such mundane diffi-
culties are difficult to challenge except with recourse to the very methodo-
logical tools found wanting to begin with.
PROFITABLE FAILURE AND THE CONSTRAINTS
OF METHODOLOGICAL MIMESIS
As the Maudsley debate highlighted, numerous practitioners are frustrated
with the limitations of RCTs in psychiatry and their inability to provide
reliable evidence of the value of a treatment when distributed clinically. At
the same time as people point out their limitations, clinical trials command
increasing political importance, particularly with the emergence of bodies
such as the UK’s NICE, a body that devises treatment guidelines that doctors
and nurses working in the National Health Service must adhere to. In formu-
lating guidelines, bodies such as NICE explicitly privilege the evidence from
RCTs over other forms of experiential evidence, in part because RCTs are
perceived as the most rigorous form of experimentation in medicine (see
Heimer et al., 2005; Kendall and McGoey, 2007). Even though NICE guidance
is often questioned by practising clinicians, who suspect guidelines are less
reliable – and more politically vulnerable – than is purported by NICE staff,
clinicians must take care, through the need to avoid suggestions of mal-
practice, in appearing publicly compliant with a system they often privately
object to.
If a practitioner does want to challenge the authority of an individual RCT,
or the reliability of individual treatment guidelines, he or she must have
recourse to corroborative evidence to support his or her dissent, preferably
in the form of more RCTs. It is the very methodological weaknesses of RCTs
that imbues them with the authority they hold: for to deny the reliability of
a particular study, one must reach for more data, more studies, larger RCTs,
in order to justify the validity of one’s objections. Of course, individuals are
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free to suggest that RCTs themselves are incapable of arbitrating in the debate
before them. But what data do they possess, what representation, what visuals,
what inscriptions (cf. Latour, 1986) does such a dissenter have at hand to
convince others of the value of her or his interpretation over others’? The
problem is not that individuals are incapable of or restrained from challeng-
ing RCTs, but that, unless they have the resources to defend the scientific
rigour of their objections, preferably through RCT evidence, their inter-
locutors are equally free to remain deaf.
The mimetic authority of RCTs – the way that the solution to flawed RCTs
is to conduct more of them – can be compared to Michael Power’s work on
the productive failure of auditing systems. Power has demonstrated how
failed audits tend to produce calls for more audits, rather than for reconsid-
erations of auditing systems in general. The failure of audit, in other words,
is the inability to blow the whistle on the failure of audit, something that is
useful for considering the questions of why systems in general – whether
administrative, political, or methodological – tend to assume greatest author-
ity and, arguably, remain most impervious to effective dissent or challenge,
at the very point when individuals speak of their widespread inefficacy:
Indeed, the great puzzle of financial audit is that it has never been a more
powerful and influential model of administrative control than now, when
many commentators talk of an auditing crisis. (Power, 1994: 7)
Why is the authority of RCTs augmented, rather than diminished, the more
people point out the limitation of individual studies? What has rendered
RCTs for psychotropic drugs so invulnerable to the widespread recognition
of their inadequacies in determining clinical effects? One answer lies in the
influence of methodological mimesis. The solution to failed audit is more
audit. The solution to failed RCTs is more RCTs, their shortcomings magni-
fied through techniques such as meta-analyses which aggregate individual
studies (McGoey, 2009).
This point helps to illuminate why controversies from seemingly antithet-
ical parties – such as the explicit opposition between those who doubt the
efficacy of SSRIs and those who defend the usefulness of the drugs – tend to
strengthen the authority of the methodologies that failed to supply adequate
evidence of the drug’s efficacy in the first place. A reason for this is that the
personal illusio of individuals, or their shared sense of investment in the rules
of a game and its outcome, tends to structure resistance to the game itself
according to certain tacit assumptions (Bourdieu, 1992: 66; McGoey, 2009).6
In science and medicine, the shared illusio of clinicians, policy-makers
and regulators alike is faith in the moral authority of objectivity, or a belief
that, as Nikolas Rose notes of the governing influence of impartiality and
objectivity in science, ‘impersonality rather than status, wisdom or experi-
ences’ should dictate the delivery of medical care and direction of scientific
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invention. In cases where objectivity remains elusive, the ability to appear
objective carries a degree of political and moral capital; capital which com-
pounds social and political belief in the value of objectivity, regardless of how
unattainable personal detachment is in practice (Daston, 1994; Daston and
Sibum, 2003; Porter, 1995; Rose, 1999: 208). Even when researchers are aware
of the contingency of RCT results, their illusio cues them to the importance
of appearing ignorant of that contingency. In science and medicine, all parties
invest strategically in the need to appear as divested of personal interest as
possible.
Although Kirsch himself questioned the reliability of NICE’s numerical
threshold for clinical significance in an article published with Moncrieff in
2004, he is forced to adopt that threshold in order to justify his own pro-
nouncements on the efficacy of antidepressants, strengthening the rhetorical
authority, and seeming universality, of thresholds that were arbitrarily con-
structed to begin with. This may, at first, seem unproblematic. If anything,
Kirsch’s flexibility in alternatively questioning and then adopting NICE’s
threshold seems to illuminate the ability of individual dissenters to sway a
crowd and convince others through appropriating the very methodologies
they object to. Science, in short, always furnishes the tools to undermine its
own truths.
That interpretation seemed to be the perspective shared by the audience
on 4 June. At the beginning of the debate, Fahy took a poll of the room,
asking the crowd to vote for or against the motion: ‘The house believes that
antidepressants are no better than placebo’. Of the 200 or so attendees, almost
150 were against the motion: unsurprising in a room full of psychiatrists
charged with the duty to prescribe the drugs each day. After the panellists
presented their cases and answered questions from the floor, Fahy retook the
poll. Though the vast majority in the room still sided with Wolpert and
Goodwin, at least 40 either abstained or voted in favour of the motion –
seemingly persuaded by the fact that Kirsch and Moncrieff had presented the
most detailed evidence to back their views, while Wolpert relied solely on
personal experience, and Goodwin managed only to question the reliability
of RCT methodologies. If the debate had been titled ‘The RCTs Don’t Work’,
rather than ‘The Drugs Don’t Work’ it is possible not a single dissenting voice
might have been heard.
Here is where the key paradox appears. Never before have the inadequa-
cies of RCTs been so apparent to so many. Yet, equally, never before have
those in positions of authority – from regulators, to NICE policy-makers,
to doctors – relied so extensively on RCT evidence. Because of the seeming
ability of RCTs to control personal and professional bias, their results are
regularly viewed as more neutral than other forms of inquiry. Yet the vast
majority of RCTs are conducted by entities with a commercial stake in their
outcome. The ability of Kirsch to challenge his interlocutors through an
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adoption of their methods seems to indicate the democratic flexibility of
science: its openness to feisty iconoclasts such as Kirsch or Moncrieff. Yet,
had his dissent been voiced through a rejection of RCT methodology – had
he offered, as Wolpert did, mere personal reflections – his objections would
have won him little credibility.
Many forms of dissent are speakable, but in order to be audible, Kirsch’s
objections had to be voiced in a manner comprehensible to his rivals. His
dissent was dictated and stipulated by the very authorities that engendered
that dissent, ultimately solidifying the authority of RCTs that failed to provide
reliable evidence in the first place. Science may furnish the tools to undermine
itself, but they must be scientific tools: ensuring that regardless of the radical-
ism of the critique, the triumph of science – the illusion of science’s detach-
ment from politics – is cemented, fuelled by the very challenges it provokes.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, I used the recent controversy over Kirsch’s study in order to
examine the larger question of why RCTs have tended to command greater
regulatory and popular legitimacy the more that people point out their
failures. I described how, regardless of whether they have value clinically,
the erroneous perception of trials as being value-free politically increases the
rhetorical capital they contain. If anything, the more useless RCTs are in
practice, the more their strength is augmented, as more and more practitioners
rally around a call for more RCTs in order to remedy the failings of previous
trials. In some ways, my analysis reminds me of a problem long rehearsed in
political theory and sociology: the question of why political resistance rarely
leads to effective political change, and why, as Bourdieu reminds us in essays
such as ‘Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic
Field’ (1999), critique is so easily appropriated by the authorities that have
elicited objections to their rule. The contribution of this article has been to
examine the ways that the profitable failure of clinical trial methodologies
helps facilitate the ability of dominant authorities to appropriate resistance
itself.
The tendency of dominant authorities to absorb challenges to their rule
particularly during periods of crisis or failure can be seen in a variety of politi-
cal or economic arenas, such as the current financial crisis, where the failure
of the finance sector is simultaneously the opportunity of those who have
presided over that failure: their expertise becomes even more valued in the
aftermath of the collapse of an architecture they helped to build, if only
because the deployment of new forms of experiments is deemed too risky
for desperate times. This point helps to shed light on the question of why
catastrophic situations rarely produce much systemic change, and why, in
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considering how it can be that failed technologies or methodologies retain
the political clout they do, it is useful to examine which authorities gain the
most from the perpetuation of useless methodologies.
NOTES
My thanks go to Andrew Barry, Scott Vrecko, Martyn Pickersgill and Ayo Wahlberg
for comments on an earlier draft. The article was made possible by an ESRC post-
doctoral fellowship carried out at Oxford’s School of Geography. An earlier version
of this article was presented at a workshop at Harvard University, co-hosted by the
European Neuroscience and Society Network and Harvard’s Department for the
History of Science. I am grateful to participants for their feedback.
1 The debate is available by podcast on the Institute of Psychiatry’s website:
http://www.iop.kcl.ac.uk/podcast/?id=238&type=item
2 For a discussion of Kirsch’s earlier studies on antidepressant efficacy, see Wilson,
2008.
3 Although Marks’s study of the adoption of RCT techniques by US physicians
and regulators is justly celebrated as a seminal study of the history of RCTs, he
misinterprets the influence of Ronald Fisher’s statistical theory on the adoption
of randomization in trials conducted by Bradford Hill. Iain Chalmers’s work is
useful on this point (Chalmers, 2005).
4 A seminal example of this is the case of Vioxx, where manufacturers and regula-
tors dismissed early evidence that the drug led to cardiac failure because the
evidence was not presented as being statistically significant. One Vioxx trial, for
example, showed a ratio of five heart attacks on the Vioxx arm, versus one on
the control arm. Despite the 80 per cent increased risk of heart failure on Vioxx,
the published study of the trial stated there was no difference in effects between
treatment and control groups, because the difference was not statistically signifi-
cant. See Ziliak and McCloskey for further discussion (2008).
5 Randomized trials are, of course, not the sole experimental settings where exper-
imenters must play creatively with techniques geared at eliciting reactions from
participants most amenable to the desired outcome of the experiment, while
simultaneously appearing as unobtrusive and non-directional as possible. Javier
Lezaun has examined, for example, the efforts of moderators carrying out focus
group research to mitigate ‘the conflicting burdens of objective detachment from,
and natural empathy with the research subjects’ (Lezaun, 2007). With both focus
groups and RCTs, the success of the experiment is contingent on how effectively
its artificiality is concealed; on how successful moderators are at effacing their
own presence.
6 In The Logic of Practice, Bourdieu describes ‘illusio’ as faith in the rules of a game
inculcated through one’s adjustment to the demands of a field – his term for
any setting where agents and their social positions are located – through one’s
immersion within the field. Illusio is ‘the sense of investment in the game and the
outcome, interest in the game, commitment to the presuppositions – doxa – of
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the game’. Illusio is a shared faith in the obvious sensibility of a game’s rules; a
faith which is unrecognized as belief because players are unaware their mere
participation confirms an investment in and acceptance of the game’s structure
and consequences (1992: 66–7).
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